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1. Introduction
The core is a cooperative solution that defines situations presenting coalitional stability, in the
sense that groups of individuals have no incentive to deviate. That is, there is no coalition that is
able to attain an outcome by itself improving all their members. Under the presence of asymmetric
information, the set of outcomes that a coalition can block depends upon the initial information and
the communication opportunities of its members. Thus, a variety of notions of core can be stated.
The different core concepts that we find in the literature consider only three possible scenarios
regarding the information that members of a coalition are able to use: they are restricted to the
common information, they keep their private information, or the information is shared. Moreover,
the criteria that specify the information for coalitions do not involve uncertainty (see Wilson, 1978,
Yannelis, 1991, Allen, 2006 and Herve´s-Beloso, Meo and Moreno-Garc´ıa, 2014, among others).
Our aim is to provide and analyze alternative definitions of the core where, in contrast to the
aforementioned notions, the information associated to coalitions is not uniquely determined. To be
precise, when a coalition is formed, agents have beliefs about the possible informational profiles that
will be followed by the group. When these beliefs are given by a probability distribution and the
blocking mechanism considers expected utility functions over the possible informational scenarios,
we obtain the risky core. More general, when beliefs are given by a set of probability distributions
and agents are α-maxmin expected utility maximizers a la Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci
(2004), we get the ambiguous core.
Our results include topological properties of the risky core (Proposition 1) and show that it
shrinks when agents either give larger probability to more informative scenarios (Proposition 2) or
become less risk averse (Proposition 5). The risky core may be non-empty even when the fine core is
empty and agents have access to more than their private information (Proposition 3). In addition,
we prove existence of the risky core when agents cannot obtain more than their private information
(Proposition 4) and when they are maxmin expected utility maximizers (Proposition 7).
Regarding the ambiguous core, the blocking power of coalitions depends on the parameter α,
which determines individuals’ degree of ambiguity aversion. We show that larger the ambiguity
aversion more difficult to block allocations and then larger the ambiguous core. Moreover, when α
increases the ambiguous core ranges between the intersection and the union of the associated risky
cores (Proposition 6). These results jointly with our findings for the risky core allow us to obtain
several properties for the ambiguous core (Corollaries 6.1-6.6 and Proposition 7).
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The construction of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section 3 focuses
on the informational profiles that coalitions may have and on the veto mechanism. Section 4 defines
the risky core and states its properties. Section 5 is devoted to the ambiguous core. Section 6 shows
a result on the relationship between no trade and the non-emptiness of risky and ambiguous cores.
An auxiliary Lemma is stated and proved in a final Appendix.
2. The economy
Let us consider an exchange economy E with differential information and with a finite set N =
{1, . . . , n} of consumers. The economy extends over two time periods. The exogenous uncertainty
is described by a finite set of states of nature Ω that can be realized at the second period, where
consumption takes place. At the first period agents have access to a complete set of contingent
contracts.
There is a finite number ` of commodities in each state and (R`+)k is the consumption set, where
k denotes the number of elements of Ω. Each agent i ∈ N is characterized by a continuous utility
function Ui : (R`+)k → R+ and by her endowments ei = (ei(ω), ω ∈ Ω) ∈ (R`+)k. In addition, i
is partially and privately informed about the states of nature in the economy: she only knows a
partition Pi of Ω, in the sense that she is not able to distinguish those states of nature that are in
the same element of Pi. Thus, we assume that ei is Pi-measurable.
1
An allocation x assigns a commodity bundle xi(ω) to each consumer i in each state ω. An
allocation is feasible if it is both physically feasible and informationally feasible. The allocation
x is physically feasible if
∑
i∈N xi(ω) ≤
∑
i∈N ei(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω. The allocation x is informationally
feasible if it is compatible with the private information of each consumer, i.e., xi := (xi(ω);ω ∈ Ω)
is Pi-measurable for every agent i ∈ N. The set of feasible allocations is denoted by F .
Let P be the set of all partitions of Ω. An information P ′ is finer than P (equivalently, P is coarser
than P ′), and we write P ≤ P ′, if P ′(ω) ⊆ P (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω. This binary relation is reflexive,
transitive and antisymmetric. Thus, (P,≤) is a partially ordered set. The join of {Pi : i ∈ S},
denoted by P∨S =
∨
i∈S Pi, is the coarsest information that is finer than Pi for every i ∈ S. The
meet of {Pi : i ∈ S}, denoted by P∧S =
∧
i∈S Pi, is the finest information that is coarser than Pi for
every i ∈ S.
1Given a partition P of Ω, x = (x(w))w∈Ω ∈ (R`+)k is said to be P -measurable when it is constant on the elements
of the partition P . That is, x(ω) = x(ω′) for all states ω and ω′ belonging to the same element of P.
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3. Coalitions and information
In general terms, an allocation belongs to the core if it is feasible and it is not blocked by any
coalition. Addressing differential information economies, to propose a cooperative solution concept
like the core, one has to specify the information that coalitions have. In this work, we consider that
individuals are not perfectly aware about the information that is going to be obtained when they
join a coalition. Each member of a coalition may keep her private information but this information
may also change and become finer or coarser. The finest information is attained when information
is totally shared by the individuals and the coarsest information is given when they are restricted to
the common information. Any other information that arises when they partially restrict or partially
share their private information is also considered.
Consider that an agent i in a coalition S may get either a finer or coarser information than her
private information Pi. Thus, the information structure that agent i may have belongs to Γ
i(S) =
F i(S) ∪ Ci(S), where F i(S) = {P ∈ P : Pi ≤ P ≤ P∨S } and Ci(S) = {P ∈ P : P∧S ≤ P ≤ Pi}.2
When the coalition S is formed a profile of information structures P = (Pi, i ∈ S) is an element of
Γ(S) =
∏
i∈S Γ
i(S) ⊆ P|S|, where |S| is the cardinality of S. The effects that the process of coalition
formation has on the available information is described by a correspondence γ that associates to
each coalition S the set of possible profiles of information structures γ(S) ⊆ Γ(S) that are assigned
to its members.
Within this framework, and in order to block an allocation, members of a coalition S consider
net trades for every possible profile of information structures determined by γ(S).
Definition (Family of net trades attainable for coalitions)
Given a coalition S, a vector z = (zP ,P ∈ γ(S)), where zP = (zPi , i ∈ S) ∈ R`k|S| is a family of net
trades attainable for S if the following conditions are satisfied for each P = (P ′i , i ∈ S) ∈ γ(S) :
(i) zP is physically feasible for S, i.e.,
∑
i∈S z
P
i (ω) ≤ 0 for every ω ∈ Ω.
(ii) For each i ∈ S, zPi is P ′i -measurable.
Definition (Allocations attainable for coalitions)
A vector y = (yP ,P ∈ γ(S)) is an attainable allocation for S if there exists a family of net trades z
attainable for S such that, yP = (ei + zPi , i ∈ S), for every P ∈ γ(S). Let Fγ(S) denote the set of
2Note that Γi(S) is different to {P ∈ P : P∧S ≤ P ≤ P∨S }. This is basically due to the fact that the order ≤ is not
complete in P. However, ≤ is a complete order restricted to Γi(S).
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attainable allocations for S.
We assume that each consumer takes into account the coalition she joins and the set of bundles
that coalitions are able to attain in each possible scenario. Therefore, when agent i is a member of
a coalition S the preference relation over the set of allocations that S could obtain is represented
by a utility function V Si :
(
R`k+
)mS → R+, where mS is the cardinality of γ(S). To be consistent,
we assume that for any a ∈ R`k+ we have V Si (a, . . . , a) = Ui(a) for every S and every i ∈ S.
A feasible allocation is in the core if it is not blocked by any coalition. A coalition S blocks
x = (xi, i ∈ N) if there exists an allocation y = (yP ,P ∈ γ(S)) attainable for S such that V Si (yi) >
Ui(xi) for every i ∈ S, where yi = (yPi ,P ∈ γ(S)).3
Remark 1. It is worth noting that well-known notions of core for asymmetric information economies
can be obtained as particular cases (see, for instance, Wilson, 1978, Yannelis, 1991, Allen, 2006 and
Herve´s-Beloso, Meo and Moreno-Garc´ıa, 2014). To be precise, if γ(S) = {(P∧S , . . . , P∧S )} we obtain
the coarse core C∧(E); when γ(S) = {(Pi, i ∈ S)} we obtain the private core C◦(E); and when
γ(S) = {(P∨S , . . . , P∨S )} we obtain the fine core C∨(E).
Remark 2. An additional particular case is when only three possible scenarios may occur re-
garding the information that members of a coalition are able to use: they are restricted to the
common information, they keep their private information, or the information is shared, i.e., γ(S) =
{(P∧S , . . . , P∧S ), (Pi, i ∈ S), (P∨S , . . . , P∨S )}, ∀S ⊆ N . Within this framework a family of net trades
for a coalition S will be denoted by z = (z∧i , z
◦
i , z
∨
i ; i ∈ S)
4. The risky core
In this section, we analyze situations in which each agent has beliefs, which are determined by
probability distributions, regarding the profile of information structures that coalitions will follow.
3Following the related literature, we consider the strong veto condition requiring that every member in a block-
ing coalition becomes better off. Even with continuous and monotone utility functions, in differential information
economies the weak and strong veto are not equivalent. To show this, consider an economy with three consumers,
three states and one commodity. Private information structures are P1 = {{a, b}, {c}}, P2 = {{a, c}, {b}} and
P3 = {{a}, {b, c}}. Endowments are e1 = (1, 1, 0) e2 = (1, 0, 1), and e3 = (0, 0, 0). The expected utility functions are
U1(xa, xb, xc) = (xa + xb)/4 + xc/2, U2(xa, xb, xc) = (xa + xc)/4 + xb/2 and U3(xa, xb, xc) = (xb + xc)/4 + xa/2.
The endowment allocation is blocked in the weak sense by the big coalition via the allocation that assigns (0, 0, 1) to
agent 1, (0, 1, 0) to agent 2 and (1, 0, 0) to agent 3. However, there is no coalition that blocks the endowments in the
strong sense.
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Given a coalition S ⊆ N , let R(S) be the set of vectors (ri; i ∈ S), where ri = (rPi ,P ∈ γ(S)) is
a probability distribution on γ(S) and hence rPi can be interpreted as the probability that agent i
gives to the implementation of the profile of information P when S is formed. Let R∗(S) be the set
of vectors r ∈ R(S) that induce distributions of probability that only depend on the coalition and
not on the identity of each agent. Let R = ∏S⊆N R(S) and R∗ = ∏S⊆N R∗(S).
Definition (Risky core)
Given r = (r(S);S ⊆ N) ∈ R, the risky core Cr(E) is the set of feasible allocations that are not
blocked by any coalition S when for every agent i ∈ S
V Si (y) =
∑
P∈γ(S)
rPi (S) Ui(y
P
i ), ∀i ∈ S, ∀S ⊆ N,
where r(S) = (ri(S); i ∈ S) and ri(S) = (rPi (S);P ∈ γ(S)).
It is well known that C∨(E) ⊆ C◦(E) ⊆ C∧(E). Moreover, as a direct consequence of the definition,
Cr(E) ⊆ C∧(E), ∀r ∈ R. The following example shows not only that these inclusions are strict but
also allows us to conclude that the risky core concept differs from the coarse, private, and fine core.
Example 1. Consider an economy with two states of nature and one commodity. There are two
individuals, A and B, that differ only in their private information: agent A has complete information,
while B has no information about the realization of the state of nature. They have the same original
utility function, U(a, b) = ab, and the same endowments, eA = eB = (1, 1). It is not difficult to
verify that C∧(E) = C◦(E) = C∨(E) = {((1, 1), (1, 1))}
Consider that γ({A,B}) is the set given by the three informational profiles that are obtained
when both agents use the sharing information, or the private information, or the common informa-
tion. Let r ∈ R be such that the probability α associated to share information belongs to (1/4, 3/4).
Following the notation stated in Remark 2, let (yA, yB) = (y
∨
i , y
◦
i , y
∧
i ; i ∈ {A,B}) be the attainable
allocation given by y∧A = y
◦
A = y
∨
B = (0, 0) and y
∧
B = y
◦
B = y
∨
A = (2, 2). Then, VA(yA) = 4α and
VB(yB) = 4(1 − α). It follows that the coalition formed by both agents A and B blocks the initial
allocation and therefore it does not belong to the risky core Cr(E). Actually, in this economy the
risky core is empty. 
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To show topological properties of the risky core, notice that for any r ∈ R the risky core can be
written as Cr(E) = {x ∈ F : Ω(r, x) ≤ 0}, where
Ω(r, x) = max
S⊆N
max
y∈Fγ(S)
min
i∈S
 ∑
P∈γ(S)
rPi (S) Ui(y
P
i )− Ui(xi)
 .
Proposition 1
If {Ui}i∈N are continuous functions, then the following properties hold:
(a) For any (x, r) ∈ F ×R, the risky core Cr(E) and {µ ∈ R : x ∈ Cµ(E)} are closed sets.
(b) The set {r ∈ R : Cr(E) 6= ∅} is closed.
(c) For any x ∈ F and S ⊆ N , {r ∈ R : x is blocked by S} is an open set.
Furthermore, if {Ui}i∈N are concave, {r ∈ R : x is blocked by S} is convex.
Proof. (a) Under continuity of utility functions, Ω : R × F → R is continuous. Therefore, the
correspondence r ∈ R Cr(E) has closed graph, which ensures the statement (a).
(b) Let {rm}m∈N ⊆ R be a sequence converging to r and satisfying Crm(E) 6= ∅, ∀m ∈ N. We want
to prove that Cr(E) 6= ∅. For it, take xm ∈ Crm(E). Notice that, the compactness of the set F of
feasible allocations implies that, taking a subsequence if it is necessary, {xm}m∈N converges to some
x ∈ F . If x /∈ Cr(E), then there exists a coalition S and an attainable allocation y ∈ Fγ(S) such that,
for every i ∈ S one has ∑P∈γ(S) rPi (S) Ui(yPi ) > Ui(xi). Thus, the continuity of utility functions
implies that, for m large enough, xm /∈ Crm(E), a contradiction. Therefore, Cr(E) is non-empty.
(c) An attainable allocation x is blocked by a coalition S under a risk r if and only if there exists
y ∈ Fγ(S) such that Fi(r, yi, xi) :=
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) − Ui(xi) > 0, ∀i ∈ S. The continuity of
the functions {Fi}i∈S on r ensures that there exists  > 0 such that Fi(r˜, yi, xi) > 0, ∀i ∈ S, ∀r˜ ∈
R : ‖r − r˜‖ < . That is, {r ∈ R : x is blocked by S} is an open set.
Finally, suppose that x /∈ Cr(E)∪Cr˜(E) can be blocked by a same coalition S under r and r˜. Then,
there are attainable allocations y, y˜ ∈ Fγ(S) such that, for every i ∈ S one has
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) >
Ui(xi) and
∑
P∈γ(S) r˜
P
i (S) Ui(y˜
P
i ) > Ui(xi). Given γ ∈ (0, 1), let rγ = γr+ (1− γ)r˜. It follows from
the concavity of utility functions that for each i ∈ S we have that,
Ui(xi) < γ
∑
P∈γ(S)
rPi (S) Ui(y
P
i ) + (1− γ)
∑
P∈γ(S)
r˜Pi (S) Ui(y˜
P
i )
≤
∑
P∈γ(S)
rPγ,i(S) Ui
(
γrPi (S)
rPγ,i(S)
yPi +
(1− γ)r˜Pi (S)
rPγ,i(S)
y˜Pi
)
.
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Therefore, x /∈ Crγ (E) for any γ ∈ (0, 1). 
Definition (Totally ordered informational structure)
The correspondence γ determines a totally ordered informational structure when γ(S) is a totally
ordered subset of Γ(S), for any coalition S ⊆ N .
Definition (First-order stochastic dominance)
Given a totally ordered informational structure and rˆ, r ∈ R, rˆ first-order stochastically dominates
r if the probability distribution rˆi(S) first-order stochastically dominates ri(S), for every coalition
S and for each agent i ∈ S.4
The following result shows that the risky core becomes smaller when agents assign larger proba-
bilities to more informative informational profiles.
Proposition 2
Let γ be a totally ordered informational structure and rˆ, r ∈ R∗. If {Ui}i∈N are concave functions
and rˆ first-order stochastically dominates r, then Crˆ(E) ⊆ Cr(E).
Proof. Let S ⊆ N be a coalition that blocks x /∈ Cr(E). That is, there exists y ∈ Fγ(S) such
that
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P(S) Ui(yPi ) > Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ S. Since γ is totally ordered, we can write γ(S) =
{P1, . . . ,PmS}, where Ph = (Phi , i ∈ S) and Phi ≤ P h˜i , for every h ≤ h˜ and every i ∈ S. Furthermore,
as rˆ first-order stochastically dominates r, it follows from the Lemma in the Appendix that, for each
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m(S)} and h ∈ {1, . . . , k} there exists ak,h ≥ 0 such that,
m(S)∑
h=k
ah,k = r
Pk(S),
k∑
h=1
ak,h = rˆ
Pk(S), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m(S)}.
Therefore, the fact that y ∈ Fγ(S) ensures that the allocation yˆ characterized by
yˆP
k
i =
k∑
h=1
ak,h
rˆPk(S)
yP
h
i , ∀i ∈ S, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m(S)},
4Remember that the first-order stochastic dominance notion requires the support of probability distribution to be
totally ordered, which is equivalent to require that γ is totally ordered.
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is attainable for S. Furthermore, the concavity of utility functions implies that
m(S)∑
k=1
rˆP
k
(S) Ui(yˆ
Pk
i ) ≥
m(S)∑
h=1
m(S)∑
k=h
ak,h
Ui(yPhi ) ≥ m(S)∑
h=1
rP
h
(S) Ui(y
Ph
i ) > Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ S.
We conclude that x /∈ Crˆ(E). 
The fine core of a differential information economy may be an empty set, because coalitions in-
crease their veto power if blocking allocations are just required to be compatible with the shared
information. The next result shows that the non-emptiness of Cr(E) requires that agents do not
assign large probabilities to the profile given by sharing information.
Proposition 3
(a) If {Ui}i∈N are concave functions, then C∨(E) ⊆ Cr(E), ∀r ∈ R∗.5
(b) If C∨(E) = ∅ and P∨S := (P∨S , . . . , P∨S ) ∈ γ(S) for any S ⊆ N , then there exists κ ∈ (0, 1) such
that Cr(E) = ∅ for any risk r ∈ R such that min
S⊆N
min
i∈S
r
P∨S
i (S) ≥ κ.
Proof. (a) Let S ⊆ N be a coalition that blocks x /∈ Cr(E). That is, there exists y ∈ Fγ(S) such
that
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P(S) Ui(yPi ) > Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ S. Notice that, for every P ∈ γ(S) and i ∈ S, yPi is P∨S -
measurable. Since the concavity of utility functions implies that Ui
(∑
P∈γ(S) r
PyPi
)
> Ui(xi),∀i ∈
S, we conclude that x /∈ C∨(E).
(b) Given S ⊆ N , let F∨S be the set of allocation (yi, i ∈ S) such that
∑
i∈S yi ≤
∑
i∈S ei and yi is∨
h∈S Ph measurable for every i ∈ S. Suppose that C∨(E) = ∅. The continuity of utility functions,
the compactness of sets {F∨S }S⊆N , and the emptiness of the fine core ensure that the continuous
mapping Φ characterized by (x, θ) ∈ F × [0, 1] −→ Φ(x, θ) := max
S⊆N
max
y∈F∨S
min
i∈S
(θUi(yi)− Ui(xi))
satisfies the following properties: (i) for any θ′, θ ∈ [0, 1], if θ′ > θ and Φ(x, θ) > 0, then Φ(x, θ′) >
Φ(x, θ); and (ii) there exists a > 0 such that Φ(x, 1) ≥ a,∀x ∈ F .6 Given x ∈ F , let Θ(x) =
{θ ∈ [0, 1] : Φ(x, θ) ≥ a¯}, where a¯ ∈ (0, a). It is not difficult to verify that Θ is a continuous
correspondence with non-empty and compact values.7 Therefore, the Berge’s Maximum Theorem
5Example 1 shows that without the concavity of utility functions this result does not hold.
6Since C∨(E) = ∅, we have that Φ(x, 1) > 0, ∀x ∈ F . Thus, (ii) is a direct consequence of the compactness of F
and the continuity of Φ.
7For any x ∈ F , 1 ∈ Θ(x). Also, the continuity of Φ guarantees that Θ(x) is a closed subset of [0, 1]. Therefore,
Θ has non-empty and compact values. Θ is upper hemicontinuous, because has closed graph and compact codomain.
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guarantees that x ∈ F −→ min{θ : θ ∈ Θ(x)} is a continuous function and it has values strictly
lower than one. We conclude that there exists κ ∈ (0, 1) such that Φ(x, θ) > 0, ∀x ∈ F , ∀θ ∈ [κ, 1].
Given r ∈ R and x ∈ F , by definition x /∈ Cr(E) if and only if Ω(r, x) > 0. Since Ui
takes non-negative values, Ω(r, x) ≥ Φ
(
x, min
S⊆N
min
i∈S
r
P∨S
i (S)
)
. Therefore, for any r ∈ R with
min
S⊆N
min
i∈S
r
P∨S
i (S) ≥ κ, we have that Cr(E) = ∅. 
In our exchange economy with differential information a Walrasian expectation equilibrium is
given by a pair (p, x) ∈ Rlk+×Rlkn+ such that x = (xi; i ∈ N) is physically feasible and Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(y),
for each agent i and for any Pi-measurable bundle y ∈ Rlk+ such that p·y ≤ p·ei. LetW(E) be the set
of Walrasian expectation equilibrium allocations of E . The following result determines conditions
to ensure that the risky core is non-empty.
Proposition 4
Assume that agents are unable to get more than their private information.8 If utility functions
{Ui}i∈N are concave and locally non-satiated, then W(E) ⊆ C◦(E) ⊆ Cr(E), ∀r ∈ R∗.
Proof. Under continuity, concavity and locally non-satiability of utility functions, the Walrasian ex-
pectation equilibrium allocation exists and belongs to the private core. Furthermore, given r ∈ R∗
and S ⊆ N blocking x /∈ Cr(E), there exists y ∈ Fγ(S) such that
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P(S) Ui(yPi ) >
Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ S. Since agents are unable to get more than their private information, for every
P ∈ γ(S) and i ∈ S, yPi is Pi-measurable. Since the concavity of utility functions implies that
Ui
(∑
P∈γ(S) r
P(S)yPi
)
> Ui(xi),∀i ∈ S, we conclude that x /∈ C◦(E). 
In order to allow changes on utility functions, taking as given individuals’ endowments and private
informations, for any r ∈ R denote by Cr(U) the risky core of the economy where utility functions
are given by U = {Ui}i∈N . In this context, consider the following partial ordering on the set of
utility profiles: U˜  U ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ N, ∃ fi : R+ → R+ concave and increasing : Ui = fi ◦ U˜i.
Since x Θ˙(x) := {θ ∈ [0, 1] : Φ(x, θ) > a¯} has open graph, its closure is lower-hemicontinuous. In addition, given
x ∈ F and θ ∈ Θ(x)∩[0, 1), it follows from (i) that for any n ∈ N we have that Φ(x, n−1+(1−n−1)θ) > Φ(x, θ) ≥ 0.5a.
Hence {n−1 + (1−n−1)θ}n∈N ⊆ Θ˙(x) and converges to θ. This ensures that Θ(x) ⊆ Θ˙(x). We conclude that Θ = Θ˙,
which implies in the lower hemicontinuity of Θ.
8That is, for any S ⊆ N and (P ′i ; i ∈ S) ∈ γ(S) we have that P ′i ≤ Pi, i ∈ S.
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Proposition 5
If U˜  U , then Cr(U˜) ⊆ Cr(U) for any r ∈ R.
Proof. Given r ∈ R, let S ⊆ N be a coalition that blocks x /∈ Cr(U), i.e., there is y ∈ Fγ(S) such
that
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) > Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ S. Since U˜  U , for each agent i there is an increasing
and concave function fi : R+ → R+ such that
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P
i (S) fi◦U˜i(yPi ) > fi◦U˜i(xi). The concavity
of fi and the monotonicity of f
−1
i imply that x /∈ Cr(U˜). 
The following example illustrates the implications of our previous results, characterizing the risky
core in differential information economies with two agents and one commodity.
Example 2. Consider an economy E with two agents and one commodity. There are three states
of nature a, b and c. Utility functions U1, U2 : R3+ → R+ are continuous, non-decreasing, concave,
and strictly monotonic in at least one contingent commodity. Agent 1 is fully informed about the
realized state of nature, while agent 2 does not have any information, i.e., P1 = {{a}, {b}, {c}} and
P2 = {a, b, c}. Endowments (e1, e2)  0 are measurable with respect to the private information
and determine an inefficient distribution of resources, in the sense that there is a physically feasible
allocation that improves both agents with respect to the endowments. The possible informational
profiles for the big coalition are γ({1, 2}) = (P1,P2,P3), where P1 = (P1, P1), P2 = (P2, P2) and
P3 = ({{a}, {b, c}}, P2).
In this context, it is not difficult to verify that C∨(E) = ∅ and C∧(E) = C◦(E) = {(e1, e2)}.
Therefore, as the risky core is a subset of the coarse core, for any r ∈ R we have that either
Cr(E) = ∅ or Cr(E) = {(e1, e2)}.
rP3
rP2
Figure 1
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Consider a situation where the risk about the sharing rule following by the big coalition is captured
by distributions of probability that do not depend on the identity of agents, i.e., admissible risks
are elements of R∗. Note that R∗ can be identified with {(rP2 , rP3) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : rP2 + rP3 ≤ 1}.
This set is drawing in Figure 1 above, where two regions are shaded in order to apply our previous
results. The blue zone represents the risks for which the risky core is non-empty whereas risks in
the red zone leads to empty risky cores.
Properties of the blue zone. It follows from Proposition 1(b) that the risky core is non-empty in a
closed subset of {(rP2 , rP3) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : rP2 + rP3 ≤ 1}. Moreover, since under P2 and P3 agents
get no more than their private information, Proposition 4 allows us to conclude that the risky core
is non-empty in the line segment {(rP2 , rP3) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : rP2 + rP3 = 1}.
Properties of the red zone. It follows from Proposition 1 that {r ∈ R∗ : Cr(E) = ∅} is convex.
When the probability rP2 to restrict the information to the common one is zero and the probability
rP1 to share information is positive, the concavity of the utility functions U1, U2 and the inefficiency
of endowments ensure that (e1, e2) can be blocked by the grand coalition. For this reason the red
zone includes the set {0} × [0, 1). As a consequence of Propositions 2 and 3(b), the red zone is
determined by the (relative) interior of the graph of a decreasing function and always includes a
neighborhood the point (0, 0). Finally, Proposition 5 implies that, if utility functions became more
concave, then the red zone may shrink in the direction of the origin. 
5. The ambiguous core
In this section, we provide a notion of core that reflects the circumstance that, when forming
coalitions, individuals do not take decisions considering only one distribution of probability about
the informational structures. That is, there is ambiguity about the information within coalitions
and agents behave as α-maxmin expected utility maximizers a la Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and
Marinacci (2004).
Given a coalition S ⊆ N , let A(S) be the set of vectors (ai; i ∈ S), where ai is a set of prob-
ability distributions on γ(S) that are the priors of agent i about the informational profiles that
will be implemented when S is formed. Let A∗(S) be the elements of A(S) that induce distribu-
tions of probability that only depend on the coalition and not on the identity of each agent. Let
A = ∏S⊆N A(S) and A∗ = ∏S⊆N A∗(S).
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Definition (Ambiguous core)
Given α ∈ [0, 1] and a = (a(S);S ⊆ N) ∈ A the ambiguous core Cαa (E) is the set of feasible
allocations that are not blocked by any coalition S when for every agent i ∈ S
V Si (y) = α inf
ri∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S)
rPi (S) Ui(y
P
i ) + (1− α) sup
ri∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S)
rPi (S) Ui(y
P
i ),
where a(S) = (ai(S); i ∈ S) and ri = (rPi (S);P ∈ γ(S)) ∈ ai(S).
Given a ∈ A, we use the notation r ∈ a to refer to any r ∈ R that is compatible with the priors
contained in a, i.e., for every S ⊆ N and i ∈ S we have that ri(S) ∈ ai(S). Furthermore, we say
that a ∈ A is closed when ai(S) is a closed set for any agent i ∈ S and for each coalition S ⊆ N .
Proposition 6
For any a ∈ A, we have that Cαa (E) ⊆ Cα
′
a (E) for any α ≤ α′ and
C0a(E) ⊆
⋂
r∈a
Cr(E) ⊆ Cµ(E) ⊆
⋃
r∈a
Cr(E) ⊆ C1a(E), ∀µ ∈ a.
Furthermore, if a is closed, then
C0a(E) =
⋂
r∈a
Cr(E), and
⋃
r∈a
Cr(E) = C1a(E) when n = 2.
Proof. Let α ≤ α′ and x /∈ Cα′a (E). Then, there is S ⊆ N and y ∈ Fγ(S) such that, for every i ∈ S,
α inf
r˜i∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S)
r˜Pi (S) Ui(y
P
i ) + (1− α) sup
r˜i∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S)
r˜Pi (S) Ui(y
P
i )
≥ α′ inf
r˜i∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S)
r˜Pi (S) Ui(y
P
i ) + (1− α′) sup
r˜i∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S)
r˜Pi (S) Ui(y
P
i ) > Ui(xi).
This implies that x /∈ Cαa (E). Analogously, if x /∈
⋂
r∈a Cr(E), then there exists r ∈ a, S ⊆ N and
y ∈ Fγ(S) such that supr˜i∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S) r˜
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) ≥
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) > Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ S.
Hence, x /∈ C0a(E). This shows C0a(E) ⊆
⋂
r∈a Cr(E). Furthermore, if x /∈ C1a(E), then there is a coali-
tion S and y ∈ Fγ(S) such that,
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) ≥ inf r˜i∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S) r˜
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) >
Ui(xi), ∀r ∈ a, ∀i ∈ S and, therefore, x /∈
⋃
r∈a Cr(E). This shows
⋃
r∈a Cr(E) ⊆ C1a(E).
Suppose that a is closed. If x /∈ C0a(E), then there is a coalition S ⊆ N and y ∈ Fγ(S) such that
supr˜i∈ai(S)
∑
P∈γ(S) r˜
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) > Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ S. Since
∑
P∈γ(S) r˜
P
i (S) Ui(y
P
i ) is a continuous
function in r˜i(S) and ai(S) is compact, the supremum is attained. This implies that there exists
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r ∈ a such that x /∈ Cr(E). Therefore,
⋂
r∈a Cr(E) ⊆ C0a(E). The fact that C0a(E) ⊆
⋂
r∈a Cr(E) allows
us to conclude that C0a(E) =
⋂
r∈a Cr(E).
Assume that N = {1, 2} and x /∈ ⋃r∈a Cr(E). If x is not individually rational, i.e., there ex-
ists i ∈ N such that Ui(xi) < Ui(ei), then x /∈ C1a(E). Otherwise x is individually rational and
for any r ∈ a there is y ∈ Fγ(N) such that
∑
P∈γ(N) r
P
i (N) Ui(y
P
i ) > Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ N.9 Since a
is closed and the functions on the left hand side of these inequalities are continuous in ri(N), we
have inf r˜i∈ai(N)
∑
P∈γ(N) r˜
P
i (N) Ui(y
P
i ) > Ui(xi), ∀i ∈ N , implying that x /∈ C1A(E). Taking into
account that
⋃
r∈a Cr(E) ⊆ C1a(E), we conclude that C1a(E) =
⋃
r∈a Cr(E). 
These results allow us to characterize several properties of the ambiguous core as a direct con-
sequence of Propositions 2-5. The first of these properties, which is an immediate consequence of
Propositions 2 and 6, determines conditions that ensure the coincidence of the ambiguous core and
the risky core.
Corollary 6.1
Let γ be a totally ordered informational structure, {Ui}i∈N concave functions, and a ∈ A∗ closed.
If rˆ ∈ a first-order stochastically dominates every r ∈ a, then C0a(E) = Crˆ(E). Moreover, if n = 2
and r˜ ∈ a is first-order stochastically dominated by every r ∈ a, then C1a(E) = Cr˜(E).
Under concavity of utility functions, Propositions 3 and 6 guarantee that the fine core is always
contained in the ambiguous core. Furthermore, the non-emptiness of Cαa (E) requires the existence of
risk scenarios compatible with a where agents do not assign large probabilities to the profile given
by sharing information.
Corollary 6.2
If utility functions {Ui}i∈N are concave, then for any a ∈ A∗ we have that C∨(E) ⊆
⋂
r∈a Cr(E).
Furthermore, if a is also closed, then C∨(E) ⊆ Cαa (E) for all α ∈ [0, 1].
9Notice that, when n > 2 we cannot ensure that for any risk r ∈ a a same coalition blocks x.
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Corollary 6.3
If C∨(E) = ∅ and P∨S := (P∨S , . . . , P∨S ) ∈ γ(S) for any S ⊆ N , then there is κ ∈ (0, 1) such that the
following properties hold:
(a) C0a(E) = ∅ for any a ∈ A such that a ∩
{
r ∈ R : min
S⊆N
min
i∈S
r
P∨S
i (S) ≥ κ
}
6= ∅
(b) C1a(E) = ∅ for any a ∈ A such that a ⊆
{
r ∈ R : min
S⊆N
min
i∈S
r
P∨S
i (S) ≥ κ
}
and n = 2.
When agents may be unable to get more than their private information, it is possible to ensure
that the set of Walrasian expectation equilibrium allocations of E is contained in the ambiguous
core and, therefore, it is a non-empty set.
Corollary 6.4
Suppose that the utility functions {Ui}i∈N are concave and locally non-satiated. Let PS := (Pi, i ∈ S)
and a ∈ A∗ such that, for some r ∈ a, ∑
P∈γ(S):
P≤PS
rP(S) = 1, ∀S ⊆ N . Then, W(E) ⊆ C◦(E) ⊆ C1a(E).
Corollary 6.5
Suppose that utility functions {Ui}i∈N are concave and locally non-satiated. If agents are unable to
get more than their private information, then the following properties hold for any a ∈ A∗:
(a) W(E) ⊆ C◦(E) ⊆ ⋂r∈a Cr(E).
(b) If a is closed, then W(E) ⊆ C◦(E) ⊆ Cαa (E) for all α ∈ [0, 1].
As for the risky core, Propositions 5 and 6 ensure that the ambiguous core does not shrink when
agents became more risk adverse.
Corollary 6.6
If U˜  U , then for any a ∈ A :
(a)
⋃
r∈a Cr(U˜) ⊆
⋃
r∈a Cr(U) and
⋂
r∈a Cr(U˜) ⊆
⋂
r∈a Cr(U).
(b) If a is closed, then C0a(U˜) ⊆ C0a(U) and, when n = 2 we have C1a(U˜) ⊆ C1a(U).
Example 3. Following the economy in Example 2, the figure below illustrates different scenarios
where there exists ambiguity about the information within coalition.
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rP1
rP2
a1
Figure 2
a3
a2
It follows from Proposition 6 that, independently of the parameter α ∈ [0, 1], Cαa1(E) is an empty
set. Moreover, when the set of priors is a closed subset of the blue zone, as the yellow ellipse a2,
then Proposition 6 implies that Cαa2(E) = {(e1, e2)} for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, if the ambiguity is
captured by risks belonging to a3, then the ambiguous core varies with the aversion to ambiguity
α, as C0a3(E) = ∅ and C1a3(E) = {(e1, e2)}. Finally, from Corollary 6.6 we deduce that the parameter
given by inf{α ∈ [0, 1] : Cαa3(E) 6= ∅} does not increase when agents become more risk averse. 
6. On the non-emptiness of risky and ambiguous cores
The existence results for the risky and ambiguous cores we have showed in the previous sections
are based on the existence of Walrasian expectation equilibrium and assume that agents do not
obtain more than their private information when forming coalitions. In this section, inspired in
Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000), we show the non-emptiness of our cooperative
solutions without requiring any property on the informational profiles for coalitions.
Essentially, we prove that when agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers and endowments
are riskless, the existence of a common prior about the realization of the state of nature ensures
that non-trade is an stable outcome regarding to the blocking power of coalitions.
Proposition 7
Consider an economy with one commodity such that, for every i ∈ N ,
Ui(xi) = inf
pi∈∆i
∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)ui(xi(ω)),
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where ∆i is a non-empty set of priors,
10 ui is increasing and concave, and ei = δi(1, . . . , 1) for some
δi > 0. If
⋂
i∈N ∆i 6= ∅, then (ei)i∈N ∈
⋂
r∈R∗ Cr(E).
Proof. Suppose that (ei)i∈N /∈ Cr(E) for some r ∈ R∗. That is, there exist S ⊆ N and y ∈ Fγ(S)
such that
∑
P∈γ(S) r
PUi(yPi ) > Ui(ei), ∀i ∈ S. Given pi ∈
⋂
i∈S ∆i, the concavity of func-
tions {ui}i∈S guarantees that ui
(∑
P∈γ(S) r
P∑
ω∈Ω pi(ω)y
P
i (ω)
)
> ui(δi), ∀i ∈ S. Therefore,∑
i∈S
∑
P∈γ(S) r
P∑
ω∈Ω pi(ω)y
P
i (ω) >
∑
i∈S δi, which contradicts the fact that y ∈ Fγ(S). .
A direct consequence of Propositions 6 and 7 is that, for every closed a ∈ A∗ we have that the
ambiguous core Cαa (E), with α ∈ [0, 1], contains the initial allocation (ei)i∈N .
Appendix
Lemma. Suppose that rˆ = (rˆ1, . . . , rˆm) first-order stochastically dominates r = (r1, . . . , rm). Then,
for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and h ∈ {1, . . . , k} there exists ak,h ≥ 0 verifying
m∑
h=k
ah,k = r
k,
k∑
h=1
ak,h = rˆ
k, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. We show it by induction. When m = 1 there is no uncertainty and the result trivially holds.
Assume that the result is true for m = t and let us prove that it is also true for m = t+ 1. Notice
that rˆ∗ = (rˆ1, . . . , rˆt−1, rˆt + rˆt+1) first-order stochastically dominates r∗ = (r1, . . . , rt−1, rt + rt+1).
Therefore, it follows from the induction hypothesis that, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , t} and h ∈ {1, . . . , k}
there exists a∗k,h ≥ 0 verifying
∑t
h=k a
∗
h,k = r
k
∗ and
∑k
h=1 a
∗
k,h = rˆ
k
∗ .
Given k ∈ {1, . . . , t+ 1} and h ∈ {1, . . . , k}, define
ak,h =

a∗k,h, h ≤ k < t;
a∗k,h − αh, h < k = t;
a∗k,h − rt+1 − αh, h = k = t;
αh, h < k = t+ 1;
rt+1, h = k = t+ 1,
where (αh)1≤h≤t ≥ 0 satisfies
∑t
h=1 αh = rˆ
t+1 − rt+1.
10That is, ∆i ⊆ {pi ∈ RΩ+ :
∑
ω∈Ω pi(ω) = 1}.
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It follows that
∑t+1
h=k ah,k = r
k and
∑k
h=1 ak,h = rˆ
k, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , t+ 1}. 
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